Operation Saffron Dismantles First VPN: A Blow to Cybercriminal Anonymity

For years, the dark corridors of the cybercriminal underground operated on a fundamental assumption: if a threat actor utilized a sufficiently hardened, “bulletproof” anonymization service, they could remain perpetually out of reach of Western law enforcement. Cybercriminals relied heavily on these specialized virtual private networks to mask their command-and-control (C2) operations, hide illicit cash flows, and conduct reconnaissance against high-value corporate targets. However, this illusion of absolute digital invisibility has been decisively shattered. Through a masterfully executed, multi-national campaign codenamed Operation Saffron, an international law enforcement coalition led by French and Dutch authorities has dismantled First VPN (also known as First VPN Service or 1vpns), exposing the very actors who trusted it to keep them hidden.

The fall of First VPN is not merely another routine infrastructure seizure; it represents a major tactical shift in how global law enforcement fights cybercrime. For over a decade, this service acted as a premier gateway for ransomware groups, advanced persistent threats (APTs), and financial fraudsters. By neutralizing its global footprint and extracting its highly sensitive database, Operation Saffron has turned a trusted criminal shield into a devastating source of intelligence for investigators worldwide.

The Architecture of a Bulletproof Shield: What Was First VPN?

Established in 2014, First VPN was never a standard, consumer-facing privacy tool. Instead, it was a bespoke, highly commercialized utility custom-built for the cybercriminal ecosystem. The service actively avoided mainstream advertising, choosing instead to market its capabilities exclusively on closed-access, Russian-language cybercrime forums such as Exploit[.]in and XSS[.]is.

First VPN sold a simple, highly enticing promise to its exclusive clientele: absolute immunity from judicial overreach, a strict “zero-logs” architecture, and a multi-tiered routing framework designed to bypass the most stringent network surveillance. This specialized positioning made the platform an incredibly popular choice for threat actors. Over the years, First VPN became deeply embedded in the mechanics of global cybercrime, appearing in almost every major investigation supported by Europol in recent history. From initial system compromise and lateral movement to the final deployment of ransomware and data exfiltration, First VPN was the operational baseline for high-impact campaigns.

Deep Dive: The Cryptographic and Masking Engine

What made First VPN so highly regarded among sophisticated threat actors was its advanced, highly customized technological stack. To ensure that its users remained “100% invisible,” the platform deployed an array of sophisticated protocols designed to defeat deep packet inspection (DPI) and sophisticated network monitoring:

• VLESS with Reality Protocol: This was the service’s primary defense against network-level detection. VLESS is a lightweight, secure transmission protocol designed for proxy configurations. When paired with the “Reality” security extension, it completely eliminates the standard TLS handshake fingerprint. Instead of presenting a unique cryptographic signature that network firewalls could easily identify and block, the Reality protocol allowed First VPN traffic to mimic standard, highly trusted HTTPS connections pointing to mainstream public websites (such as prominent content delivery networks or cloud providers). To an external observer or automated DPI firewall, the malicious VPN traffic appeared as completely benign web browsing.
• Multi-Protocol Flexibility: First VPN allowed users to tailor their encryption and routing mechanisms based on their specific operational needs. The platform integrated support for:
  • WireGuard: Utilized for high-speed, low-overhead data exfiltration pipelines.
  • OpenConnect: Employed to emulate enterprise-grade SSL VPN connections, allowing threat actors to blend in with legitimate remote corporate employees.
  • Outline: Based on the Shadowsocks protocol, this was used to bypass highly restrictive internet service provider (ISP) blocks and state-sponsored firewalls.
  • OpenVPN ECC: Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography to deliver robust data security with minimal computational and latency overhead.
  • L2TP/IPSec: Maintained to support legacy exploitation tools and specialized network configurations.
• Tor Onion Routing Integration: To keep subscription management and administrative actions isolated from the clearnet, First VPN operated corresponding .onion domains on the Tor network. Users could register, pay via anonymous cryptocurrencies, and configure their customized routing profiles without ever exposing their true web browsers to standard DNS queries.

The Tactical Blueprint of Operation Saffron

While the public phase of the takedown concluded in May 2026, the genesis of Operation Saffron dates back to December 2021. French authorities, specifically the Cybercrime Unit of the Paris Judicial Police (BL2C), initiated the probe after identifying a recurring pattern of VPN traffic originating from the service during investigations into corporate ransomware attacks.

By 2023, French and Dutch authorities (led by the Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit, or NHTC) formalized their cooperation, establishing a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) supported heavily by Europol and Eurojust. Rather than executing an immediate, aggressive raid that would alert the service operators and prompt them to wipe their servers, the JIT opted for a patient, long-term surveillance strategy.

For nearly four years, investigators quietly mapped First VPN’s infrastructure, identified its hosting providers, and actively monitored live routing paths. This silent observation allowed law enforcement to construct a massive, multi-jurisdictional intelligence apparatus before the operators ever suspected their systems were compromised.

Neutralizing the Infrastructure: Action Days on the Global Stage

On May 19 and 20, 2026, the international coalition coordinated a lightning strike across several continents. The operation, which involved law enforcement and judicial bodies from 18 countries—including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and Ukraine—successfully dismantled the network’s structural foundations:

1. 33 Servers Seized: Authorities seized physical and virtual routing nodes operating across 27 different countries, instantly paralyzing the platform’s connection capacity.
2. Domain Takeover: The primary clearnet portals (1vpns.com, 1vpns.net, and 1vpns.org) along with all associated Tor .onion domains were officially seized, replacing the criminal login portals with law enforcement landing banners.
3. Administrator Arrest: Ukrainian authorities, acting on leads generated by the JIT, executed a physical search warrant at the residence of the service’s primary administrator, interrogating the individual and seizing key physical devices.

Shattering the “Zero-Logs” Myth: The Ultimate Intelligence Harvest

The most critical aspect of the Operation Saffron takedown is not the loss of the physical servers, but the compromise of the service’s internal data. Bulletproof VPN providers consistently market a “zero-logs” policy to attract high-paying threat actors. However, First VPN’s architecture contained critical single points of failure that allowed investigators to bypass these claims.

By infiltrating the service’s backend infrastructure prior to the physical shutdown, investigators successfully mapped active traffic flows and extracted the service’s user database. This massive data recovery completely dismantled the operational security of First VPN’s clientele:

• 506 Users Identified: Investigators successfully linked real-world IP addresses and user profiles to 506 active cybercriminals globally.
• Ransomware Connections Exposed: The seized data directly exposed members belonging to at least 25 major ransomware syndicates, including affiliates of the notorious Avaddon brand, who relied on First VPN to run their infrastructure.
• 83 Intelligence Packages: Europol has disseminated 83 comprehensive intelligence packages to international police departments, breathing new life into 21 major, ongoing cybercrime investigations.
• 5,000+ Compromised Accounts: Since its inception in 2014, the service had facilitated thousands of accounts; the historical data retrieved now provides an invaluable roadmap for solving cold-case cyber intrusions.

In a psychological blow to the underground, authorities did not just quietly collect this data. Upon taking over the network, law enforcement utilized First VPN’s own infrastructure to send direct notifications to its users, informing them that the service was dismantled and that their true identities were now known to global police agencies.

The Strategic Value of Public-Private Synergy

A critical factor in the success of Operation Saffron was the integration of private-sector threat intelligence. Romanian cybersecurity firm Bitdefender, through its highly specialized Draco Team, worked in tandem with Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) throughout the investigation.

By analyzing the unique network telemetry of the VPN’s custom protocols and mapping them against known malware communication flows, Bitdefender helped investigators bridge the gap between technical infrastructure and real-world threat actors. This joint effort sets a powerful precedent for future operations, showing that the combination of state authority and private sector technical expertise is highly effective at dismantling complex criminal networks.

What Operation Saffron Means for Enterprise Security

For enterprise Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) and security operations teams, the closure of First VPN offers several vital takeaways:

1. Cryptographic Isolation Is a Myth: No matter how robust a client’s encryption configurations are (VLESS, WireGuard, or ECC), their security is ultimately bound to the physical integrity of the hosting servers and the operational security of the administrator.
2. Anticipate Adversary Migration: Following a major infrastructure bust like Operation Saffron, displaced threat actors will quickly migrate to alternative bulletproof hosting providers and custom-built proxies. Defensive teams must remain alert for sudden, subtle shifts in incoming connection attempts and unusual TLS fingerprints.
3. The Power of the Long Game: The multi-year timeline of this operation shows that law enforcement is increasingly playing the long game. Rather than treating cyber threats with immediate, superficial blocks, JITs are quietly monitoring, gathering intelligence, and dismantling threat networks from the root up.

The successful execution of Operation Saffron sends an unmistakable warning to the cybercriminal underground. In the modern digital landscape, there is no such thing as an impenetrable shield. When the very servers trusted to guarantee anonymity are quietly monitored by international authorities, the promise of complete invisibility is nothing more than a dangerous illusion.